Morocco and Western Sahara: the Kingdom’s Diplomatic “Prism”

Alexa Fishman

Introduction

In August 2022, King Mohammed VI of the Kingdom of Morocco addressed his people in a speech to mark Morocco’s principal anti-colonial holiday, the Revolution of the King and the People. In that speech, the King made a statement that has defined the Kingdom’s foreign policy in the years since — “I would like to send a clear message to the world: the Sahara issue is the prism through which Morocco views its international environment”. His message was crystal; the “Sahara issue” — namely, the debate of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara — is the center of his country’s foreign relations, the defining factor in international politics, trade, and influence. But what is this issue, and why does it hold so much power over Morocco’s diplomatic strategy?

Background

Western Sahara is a tract of desert located southwest of Morocco that has been recognized by the United Nations (UN) as a non-self-governing territory since 1963. A region that before colonization was never ruled over by a sole power—and instead populated by unique tribes— Western Sahara was colonized in 1884, becoming the Spanish province of Spanish Sahara in 1934. To the north, the Spanish and French split Morocco between them until it gained its independence in 1957. Two decades later, then-King Hassan of Morocco staged a “Green March” of 350,000 Moroccans into Western Sahara, forcing Spain to withdraw and allowing the Kingdom to annex the territory (although they fought for control with Mauritania, who also invaded in 1975, until Mauritania withdrew four years later). This triggered an insurgency by the Polisario Front, a nationalist movement run by members of the Sahrawi, an ethnic group indigenous to the region. In 1976, the Polisario Front declared the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as an independent state in Western Sahara, and fought a war with Moroccan forces until a ceasefire in 1991. During this time, Morocco also built the berm, a sand and rock wall running from the north to south borders of Western Sahara to separate the area controlled by Morocco and the area controlled by the Polisario Front. Morocco today administers the 80% of the territory west of the berm, while the Polisario Front controls the other 20% east of the berm. 

Despite the ceasefire, tensions between Morocco and the Polisario Front remained high. Many countries, especially in Africa, had recognized the SADR as an independent state during the war, causing Morocco to leave the African Union and not rejoin until 2017. This was exacerbated by Morocco’s competition with its regional rival Algeria, who continued to supply the Polisario Front with weapons and money and allowed for the establishment of a SADR government in exile in its southeastern Tindouf Province. These tensions culminated in the Polisario Front resuming active resistance in November 2020, an insurgency that continues today. 

Morocco in Western Sahara  

Morocco’s claims to Western Sahara, while not completely unfounded, aren’t airtight either. The Kingdom claims historical ties to the land, and those do exist; between the 10th and 17th centuries, Morocco periodically penetrated Western Sahara, as well as Mauritania, Algeria, and Mali. This was done in alternating periods as Morocco also spent periods focused on Spanish encroachment. During those times of Moroccan control over Western Sahara, the Sahrawi and other indigenous peoples of the area would sometimes accept the Moroccan Sultan’s rule. However, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) didn’t believe this to be a strong enough argument for historical claims. In an advisory opinion in October 1975, the ICJ ruled that while there was evidence for legal ties between both the former Moroccan Sultan and the former “Mauritanian entity” & certain tribes living in Western Sahara, that evidence didn’t establish ties between either modern state and Western Sahara today, and therefore Western Sahara deserved self-determination. 

Despite this international opinion, in April 2007 Morocco presented its Moroccan Autonomy Plan (MAP) to the UN. Per the MAP, Western Sahara would exercise local autonomy while still under Moroccan sovereignty. Local autonomy would include legislative, judicial, and executive authority elected by Western Saharan residents, while Rabat retained jurisdiction over foreign affairs, defense, and religious matters for the territory. Not only was the plan rejected by the Polisario Front, who instead continued to call for a referendum on independence, but it was also largely ignored by the international community at the time. However, in October 2025, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2797, which supports a settlement for the Western Sahara issue under the MAP. The resolution acknowledges not only that the MAP is “a basis for a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable to the dispute” but also “that genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty could constitute a most feasible solution…that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara”. The Polisario Front rejected the resolution as they continued to advocate for a referendum, alongside Algeria, which, despite its position as a non-permanent Security Council member, did not participate in the vote.

Today, the Moroccan government calls its controlled area of Western Sahara its “Southern Provinces”, and the area is represented in Morocco’s parliament. Morocco has encouraged its citizens to move to Western Sahara, providing state subsidies for food, energy, and other utilities for those who migrate. These are all strategies for increasing Moroccan control over Western Sahara in order to achieve two key goals: accessing critical natural resources that will bolster economic success, and establishing regional influence. Western Sahara is home to vast phosphate reserves — a mineral essential for fertilizer production and agriculture — and as Morocco is a leader in phosphate exports, it is in its interest to control Western Sahara’s reserves. In fact, the Bou Craa mine in Western Sahara today produces about 10% of Morocco’s total phosphate exports. The waters off Western Sahara are also very valuable, as they could contain untapped oil deposits and are rich in fishing grounds. In terms of regional influence, there are multiple possible reasons for Morocco’s growing desire to lead North Africa, including countering Algeria, economic cooperation, strengthening security, and more. No matter the motivation, Morocco wants to exert more influence over the region, and its control of Western Sahara is a step towards doing so. 

Western Sahara in Moroccan Diplomacy

In 2020, Morocco shifted its strategy. The Royal Palace realized they could wield the issue of Western Sahara as a bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiations with other states; if a nation recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara—whether completely or under the MAP—the Kingdom would be willing to accede to that nation’s interests. In the past six years, Morocco has successfully employed this strategy widely on the world stage, earning extensive recognition by Western powers and African allies alike. 

This broad recognition began with the United States. The US had spent months negotiating the Abraham Accords, a series of agreements meant to normalize relations between several Arab countries and Israel. Originally signed between Israel & the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in September 2020, Morocco joined the Accords and normalized relations with Israel in December 2020. That same month, the United States recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and endorsed the MAP, publishing a new official map that showed Western Sahara as a part of Morocco. Coincidence it was not; American recognition was one of the main incentives for Morocco to normalize relations with Israel, and therefore was specified in the Abraham Accords agreements. This recognition was critical for Morocco; as a leading world power, the United States set an example for other nations to follow, and provided legitimacy to the Moroccan claim. 

Spain was the next major recognition. As Morocco and Western Sahara’s former colonizer, ousted decades ago, Spain’s past influence in the region has waned. While relations between the two nations have been tense, Spain’s endorsement of the MAP in March 2022 marked a reevaluation of their partnership. Almost a year later, in February 2023, Morocco and Spain signed 20 agreements at a bilateral summit. These agreements focused on migration regulation, education, and Spanish investment in Moroccan sectors such as water, agriculture, rail, and tourism. 14 more agreements and a joint declaration were signed between the two in December 2025 on natural disaster prevention, sustainability, and organization for the 2030 World Cup the two nations are co-hosting with Portugal. These agreements have greatly expanded Moroccan-Spanish relations, and would not have been created had Spain not recognized the MAP. Morocco wanted recognition, and Spain wanted economic opportunities and increased influence in North Africa. Both nations got what they wanted through Morocco’s new strategy. 

Germany followed suit in August 2022, recognizing the MAP as a part of a joint declaration that outlined a future of many partnerships between them and Morocco in the economic, political, cultural, and climate spheres. Similarly to Spain, this recognition led to multiple agreements in the years after. Germany and Morocco signed a climate and energy alliance in June 2024 to support hydrogen production in Morocco, which Germany could then import. By 2025, imports from Germany to Morocco were over 3.4 billion euro, and exports from Morocco to Germany were about 3.9 billion euro, leading Germany to declare in an official government document that “Morocco is now Germany’s second most important investment location”, especially in sustainable economic development & climate and energy. As of April 2026, 300 German companies were doing business in Morocco. This rapid expansion of economic cooperation only began after Germany’s recognition of the MAP. 

Israel’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara in July 2023 was extremely notable due to regional tensions and alternate motivations besides simply economic ties. While the Abraham Accords did not require Israel to do this, its recognition of the MAP allowed for continued cooperation and development of the young relations that began in 2020. Since Israeli recognition, there has been increased bilateral trade, security cooperation, research collaborations, and Israeli travel to Morocco. This has especially benefited Morocco on the military front, as Israeli assistance through an arms deal that included kamikaze drones and air defense, as well as security and cyber cooperation agreements, have allowed for a huge enhancement of Moroccan military capabilities to address the Polisario threat. Therefore, while Israeli recognition didn’t necessarily bring the MAP increased international legitimacy—as American, Spanish, German, and later French recognition would—it provided Morocco with vast concrete benefits. 

French recognition of the MAP in July 2024 had echoes of Spain’s motivations two years prior. As the other European power that had colonized Morocco but no longer holds the same influence in the region, France had a strong incentive to recognize Moroccan sovereignty. Just three months after French President Emmanuel Macron sent a publicized letter to King Mohammed VI calling the MAP the “only basis” to solve the conflict in Western Sahara, Morocco and France signed a declaration that established a “reinforced exceptional partnership.” The same visit led to agreements in energy and infrastructure totalling up to 10 billion euro, helping pave the way for increased French political influence and economic investment in North Africa. 

As a part of an agreement signed to increase bilateral cooperation in infrastructure projects heading into the 2030 World Cup, the United Kingdom (UK) recognized the MAP in June 2025. Britain seemingly did so mainly in return for business deals, including a procurement agreement giving British companies priority access to infrastructure contracts in Morocco. Publicly, though, the British Foreign Secretary David Lammy has lauded the MAP as “the most credible, viable, and pragmatic basis for a lasting resolution of the dispute.” The UK is the most recent leading power to recognize Moroccan sovereignty. 

However, the most recent nation to endorse the MAP is Morocco’s neighbor to the south, Mali. In April 2026, Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop announced support for the autonomy plan, becoming one of many African countries to flip their stance on the issue in recent years. The decision comes among heightened tensions with Algeria at their shared border, likely inflaming problems between Mali and the already frustrated Algiers. Mali is a very different case from Western recognition, as it is one of several states in West and Central Africa which has recently experienced a coup and now operates under unstable military rule. It has therefore been largely isolated from the international community, and Morocco sees this as an opportunity for greater regional influence, as demonstrated in its launch of the Moroccan Atlantic Initiative in November 2023. Including Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad, the Atlantic Initiative would give those landlocked countries access to the Atlantic through Moroccan ports, including in Dakhla, a coastal city in Western Sahara. While it is currently unclear how Morocco will achieve the Initiative, it does provide Mali with a huge incentive to recognize the MAP. With Morocco on its side, Mali could gain critical access to the ocean, support in its conflict with Algeria, greater government legitimacy—the possibilities are endless. Meanwhile, Morocco gets to add another country to its list of international recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara while also growing its influence in the region. 

Conclusion

Morocco’s quest for international recognition of its Moroccan Autonomy Plan has gone extremely well for it over the past six years. Since the United States endorsed the Plan, an influx of nations have done the same, and Morocco has reaped the benefits of international investment in its economy, infrastructure, and military. However, this plan has been in the diplomatic sphere for almost 20 years. While increased recognition by leading states and the UN has certainly boosted the MAP’s legitimacy, the recognition may not be enough to bring the Polisario Front back to the negotiating table or convince them to abandon their idea of an independence referendum. Even if an independent SADR were to be formed, scholars have predicted that such a nation would immediately collapse into yet another African state in turmoil, especially as the Sahrawi identity is much more fragmented along tribal lines than the Polisario Front presents it to be. There is therefore no clean solution to this issue; all one can hope for is the continuation of negotiations towards a satisfactory result for all parties involved.