Chinese Choke Points in Current Events

Kaiya Davis

Introduction

Geopolitical rivalry, wars, and changes in economic blocs have characterized the international politics of the mid-2020s. These changes have pushed the People’s Republic of China to adjust their foreign policy and stances on geopolitical events. For example, U.S. military operations in Iran and Venezuela, rising rivalry in Latin America, and tensions with regional states are forcing China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take action, especially under recent internal personnel change. Instead of directly confronting these issues, China has adopted a pragmatic approach to foreign policy, strongly guided by the need to ensure economic stability and strategic influence.

China and the Middle East

 As an anti-democracy country and a popular international lender, the CCP has invested a fair amount of money in the infrastructure and energy pipelines in both of these countries. China’s investments in Iran include a recent twenty-five-year agreement valued at approximately 600 billion USD, which is intended to support Iranian energy production, transportation networks, and financial institutions. The goal of this investment was to secure long-term access to Iranian oil as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly as China's energy demand increases with its population and economy expanding. Despite these economic ties, Iran and China maintain some distance diplomatically, as China has been working to build ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two of Iran's major rivals in the Middle East, and the religious differences between the two countries. The recent U.S. military operations in Iran and Venezuela highlight China’s complex interactions with international politics. Amidst the U.S. military strikes, Chinese officials have only verbally criticized the attacks as violations of sovereignty and called for de-escalation and diplomatic solutions, but not any retaliatory or militaristic movements. 

These recent attacks in Iran might serve as an issue for the upcoming U.S.-China conversations planned for later this year. While it may not necessarily halt the diplomatic talks, it could give China additional leverage in negotiations with Trump, particularly regarding Taiwan and tariffs. Beijing likely does not see this as a threatening expansion of American power, but rather as an unrelated regional crisis that could yield benefits in negotiations and public perception in its relationship with the White House. China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, and the current conflicts affect the stability in the Persian Gulf, threatening key shipping routes such as the Strait of Hormuz. This demands a cautious response from Beijing, as a war in the Middle East would significantly destabilize the global energy market, thereby inflicting severe harm on China’s economy and manufacturing capacity. The potential energy crisis is likely why Beijing’s only response has been a call for a ceasefire that supports neither side, emphasizing political and economic concerns over potential power struggles. 

China and Latin America

China has largely increased it’s economic presence in Latin America. Along with the proximity and land-based exapnsion with BRI, Beijing’s investments in developing countries have also expanded overseas, even overcoming the U.S. in certain countries in Latin America, which was previously regarded as the U.S. backyard. Its international interactions are increasingly competitive with those of the United States in Latin America. Over the past two decades, China has dramatically expanded its economic engagement in the region through trade partnerships, infrastructure financing, and development loans. Chinese financial institutions have supported large-scale projects, including port construction, transportation networks, and telecommunications infrastructure. Between 2014 and 2023, China provided approximately $153 billion in financial assistance to Latin American countries, significantly surpassing the roughly $50 billion provided by the United States during the same period. International Organizations, such as BRICS, have helped China accelerate diplomatic and economic relations with Latin America. China’s economic ties and interactions with Brazil have increased under Trump’s tariffs, and subsequently starting its engaging point with the rest of Latin America, by giving Latin American countries the chance to diversify their economic partnerships with less democratic regimes, which lessens the need for these developing countries to borrow from the West or other democratic-consolidating organizations that would otherwise demand regime change and challenge the hybrid regimes that are currently established. Over time, this has greatly diminished the U.S. influence in the Americas and has created a new market for China to expand into, thereby benefiting its EV, telecommunications, and other digital technology sectors. Yet the U.S. military operation that removed Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro has also revealed the limitations of China’s economic influence in geopolitical conflicts. Although China has provided financial support and diplomatic backing to the Maduro government for many years, Beijing ultimately lacks the capacity to prevent or dissuade U.S. intervention.

China and Japan

Recent snap elections and the appointment of the new Japanese Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, have prompted extensive political discourse in East Asia. Flipping the script on her late predecessor, Takaichi has been explicit in her anger toward China’s actions as a “bullying hegemon,” taking clear stances in alignment with Taiwan. This prompted China to impose several economic measures in response, including travel warnings, restrictions on tourism, and renewed bans on imports of Japanese seafood. Yet these sanctions only increased domestic support for Takaichi. With public opinion hardened against China, the recent snap election resulted in an expanded parliamentary majority for the ruling government, serving as a win for Takaichi. Economic influence has always played an integral role in Chinese international politics; its effectiveness depends heavily on domestic political conditions in target countries. As a major competitor to China in the region, Japan’s diversified economy and strong national identity make it less susceptible to economic pressure, thereby curbing China’s ability to become East Asia’s hegemon. 

Conclusion

These major events happening in international affairs have had a major impact on China’s foreign policy behavior. Military conflicts with Iran and Venezuela, economic rivalry in Latin American countries, and political tensions with democratic countries such as Japan affect China’s behavior in its relations with the global community. Common to all of these is China’s tendency to pursue its long-term economic interests and maintain political stability without confronting the United States.

Through investment and trade agreements, China continues to extend its global reach. At the same time, it is careful not to escalate global conflicts that may impact its economic progress and stability. This is part of its broader strategy of establishing itself as a stable and mature global actor and, at the same time, slowly but surely building its presence in the global community. As global politics continues to evolve and conflicts among global actors escalate, China’s role will be determined by its ability to strike a balance between cooperation and conflict.