Return Without Resolution: Germany, Syria, and Refugee Policy After Assad

Uma Miskinyar

Introduction

Germany is pushing for mass Syrian returns, but neither Syria nor refugees themselves are fully on board with repatriation.

In March 2026, Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that he and President Ahmed al-Sharaa hope that 80% of Germany’s Syrian population will return home by 2029. The chancellor rationalized his plan by arguing that the security situation in Syria, given its current status, is stable enough to justify a large-scale assisted return process, which he described as a “circular migration partnership.” 

Under Merz’s proposal, immigration authorities would review refugee returns on a case-by-case basis, prioritizing people whose temporary protection was granted solely on humanitarian grounds and who have yet to obtain permanent residency. 

With this plan come exceptions, however. Defined by steady employment, language proficiency, and no critical records in Germany, “well-integrated” Syrians would be exempt and allowed to remain and/or obtain long-term residence. The German federal government states that Merz’s outlined plan could result in the return of up to 800,000 people, with Germany offering support packages for relocation. Such packages will include both vocational grants and housing assistance inside Syria, funded jointly by Germany, the European Union (EU), and the Gulf.

Policy Origins and Political Framing

Merz’s government and the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a far-right populist party, have taken a tougher stance on refugee and migrant statuses in Germany in support of the party’s immigration outlook. Initially, Merz stated that the party’s priority would be to return “those who no longer have valid residency rights,” including those who are criminal offenders, saying more would follow. Despite noting that Syrian refugees have contributed greatly to Germany, Merz claimed that many refugees ultimately intend to return. 

During the Syrian civil war, almost a million Syrians sought refuge in Germany, but al-Sharaa and Merz’s plans contain few details on the return process. Chancellor Merz stated that after Assad’s fall, the situation had “now changed fundamentally,” and that needs for protection “must… be reassessed.” 

Sharaa’s visit to Germany, however, was accompanied by many protests, with the Kurdish Community in Germany (KGD)’s call on Merz to demand agreements regarding the protection of minorities in Syria during the visit, and accusation of human rights violations and war crimes conducted by Sharaa. 

The Nature of a Post-Assad Authority: Who is Ahmed al-Sharaa?

The interim president of Syria, in office since December 2022, is formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani. He transitioned from a jihadist commander to a head of state after leading anti-Assad forces, his rise marking a historic political realignment in post-war Syria.

After the 2003 Iraq invasion, he joined al-Qaeda affiliated insurgents, and was later detained in United States facilities, such as Camp Bucca, a forward U.S. military operating base in the vicinity of Umm Qasr, Iraq. Upon his release, al-Sharaa founded Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch. Disputes with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi led him to sever ties with both ISIS and al-Qaeda, rebranding his forces as Jabhat Fath al-Sham and later merging them into Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017. HTS established civilian rule in Idlib through the Syrian Salvation Government, balancing Islamist doctrine with administrative pragmatism.

In late 2024, his HTS-led coalition, backed by Türkiye, launched Operation Deterrence of Aggression, seizing Damascus and ending Assad’s rule. Shortly thereafter, Al-Sharaa was declared interim president and tasked with forming a transitional legislature and new army, where he pledged inclusive governance and reconciliation among Syria’s sects.

Since taking office, al-Sharaa presents himself as a nationalist rather than as a transnational Islamist, advocating for gradual democratization under Islamic law, reconstructed, integrated refugee return, and renewed diplomatic ties with the West and regional powers. As his administration faces challenges of violence, economic collapse, and the integration of rebels into state institutions, al-Sharaa remains a polarizing figure hailed by his supporters, but by his critics as a militant leader seeking to legitimize post-Assad Syria through moderation.

The evolution of his leadership suggests that Syria’s post-war state formation may be less of a rupture from its conflict-era structures rather than a reconfiguration of them. For returning refugees, this could mean navigating a political environment in which authority is uneven, negotiated, and potentially reversible, rather than institutionally guaranteed. In that sense, the feasibility of return may grasp on reduced violence, and more-so on the depth of transformation within the state itself, begging the question: can repatriation be considered sustainable if the underlying political order remains in flux?

Diverging Stakeholder Positions

Upon communicating his three-year plan for Syrian refugee return, it was clear in his meeting with al-Sharaa that this is not Merz’s first time urging Syrian refugees to return home to help rebuild Syria following the civil war. 

A lawmaker of Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD), Aydan Özoğuz, stated in a statement to Politico: “What remains [is] a figure with no plan, no legal basis — and no respect for so many people who are part of our society”. As critics of Merz’s 80 percent figure continued to express their dismay, Merz explained that this figure had been previously put forward by Sharaa, and that he remained conscious of the scaled task. Al-Sharaa denied this statement later. Syria’s foreign minister, Assad al-Shaibani, described forced returns and the diaspora as a “strategic resource” rather than a burden, and firmly rejects Germany’s proposal to deport Syrians. Al-Sharaa, on the other hand, mentioned that no force should be involved in returning the refugees back, as that would prompt greater migration and angst within German society.

Within Syria’s 14-year civil war, Germany welcomed more Syrian refugees than any other state in the EU. The overthrow of Bashar Assad by the anti-regime alliance of al-Sharaa has prompted calls within German conservative circles for Syrians to return home. As Damascus pleads for a delay in immediate returns, it hopes to rebuild not only its infrastructure, but also its fractured social systems. 

German business groups sound the alarm on Merz’s plan. The Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHK) voiced in a joint press release that acute gaps in construction are filled by Syrian nationals, alongside the healthcare and logistics industry. Concurrently, Merz makes promises to offset labor losses with his “fast-track-Blue-Card-plus” plan, which would cut work-visa processing to four weeks for shortage occupations.

Beginning in April 2026, Syrian staff on temporary protection permits may face rigorous status reviews. German companies may audit employees affected by ensuring that updated residence documentation is present and preparing to sponsor alternative work visas where warranted.

The array of mixed opinions here extend over immediate labor substitution, as the accelerated import of new skilled workers may not wholly replicate the sector-specific integration already achieved by Syrian employees embedded within localized labor markets. Over time, this could possibly produce a form of structural inefficiency, where policy-driven turnover disrupts the tacit knowledge and social capital accumulated within key industries.

Legal, Security, and Structural Constraints on Return

The nearly one million Syrians that now live in Germany mostly arrived during the 2015-2016 refugee influx, and now represent a community that has slowly become a notable pillar of Germany’s Middle Eastern diaspora. 

Merz’s announcement of mass Syrian returns has politically divided the traffic light coalition, and has rippled throughout Europe since March 30, 2026. As Austria and Denmark signal support for coordinated returns, NGOs question whether conditions in Syria truly meet the EU’s “safe country” test. Legal challenges are expected to accompany this plan, likely to move through German administrative courts in the coming years, ensuring guidelines comply with the Geneva Convention and EU frameworks of asylum law. 

A report from the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC) dated February 2025 states that, following the 2024 collapse of the Assad regime, recent developments show that despite a decline in large-scale violence, Syria remains fragile, “characterized by widespread mistrust of the governing authorities, ongoing internal conflicts and a high dependency on humanitarian assistance.” The report argues that a premature return of refugees may risk the exacerbation of food insecurity, inflation, demographic volatility, and territorial disputes. 

The BICC, though published in 2025,raises a timely argument on the suitability of Syria’s current internal state to properly support a grand reintegration of refugees in Merz’s estimated three years’ time. For families with children born into exile, ambiguity outweighs the framework for the German government’s reintegration plan, as critics argue that it portrays the asylum system as an obstacle to German society rather than as a legitimate instrument to provide urgently needed protection and legal guarantees.

Economic Integration + Long-Term Tradeoffs

According to Germany’s labor agency, 60 percent of Syrian refugees who arrived in Germany within 2015-2016 are employed, with the total employment of German nationals standing at 71%. The substantial and positive role that Syrian refugees have had on the German economy cannot be disputed. It is projected that by 2029, young Syrian newcomers who average twenty-seven years old are expected to ameliorate demographic pressure spawning from Germany’s aging native population reaching the next stage of its demographic transition.

As many Syrians remain cautious about returning home under a post-al-Assad regime, a large number celebrate in his absence, voluntarily returning home as a result. Many mixed opinions regarding al-Sharaa’s presence also circulate. For example, in a statement addressed to POLITICO, Antonios Hazim, a masters student at the Technical University in Berlin, stated that he “…wouldn’t return to Syria as long as an Islamist regime is in charge”.

Such a wide range of public opinion provides not a coherent endpoint, but a convergence of overlapping policy logics, each shaped by distinct political and economic priorities. Within the space of such diversifying opinions, policy begins to not solely reflect resolution, but the management of such contradictions themselves, ranging between labor demand, legal frameworks, and the ambiguity of external stability.

Unresolved Tensions of a Managed Return

A “ready” Syria begins to look less like a measurable condition and more like a negotiated threshold, defined differently by governments, institutions, and those expected to return. Authority under Ahmed al-Sharaa remains in formation, and while external recognition may grow, internal trust is still uneven, shaped by memory, fear, and the unpredictability of local power. For returning refugees, the decision is not only about physical safety, but about whether the rules of belonging feel durable enough to risk rebuilding a life within them.

 Germany’s policy thereby operationalizes this ambiguity, transforming an unresolved political transition into a timeline that individuals are expected to absorb. In doing so, it reveals a broader tension at the heart of contemporary migration policy: the attempt to impose administrative clarity onto conditions that remain politically and institutionally unsettled.